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Bank,	 by	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 encompassed	 the	 complexities	 of	 a	 large-scale	
industrial	enterprise.	It	employed	a	workforce	of	several	hundred.	Its	workers	operated	in	specialised	
and	coordinated	capacities.	 Its	managerial	hierarchy	was	diffuse	and	dependent	on	employed	men,	
rather	 than	 the	 elected	 directorate.	 The	 Bank,	 therefore,	 warrants	 comparison	 with	 the	 types	 of	



















Sidney	 Pollard’s	 seminal	 work	 posited	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 genesis	 of	
management	was	a	‘glaring	gap’	in	the	history	of	industrialising	Britain.1	Yet	his	own	analysis	
remained	 narrowly	 focused	 on	 the	 factory	 and	 other	 large	 industrial	 processes.	 Forms	 of	
economic	 activity	 that	 might	 have	 displayed	 similar	 complexity	 were	 mentioned	 only	 in	
passing.	In	particular,	Pollard	failed	to	acknowledge	one	of	the	largest	and	most	significant	
enterprises	of	the	late-eighteenth-	and	early-nineteenth	centuries:	the	Bank	of	England.	This	
paper	will	demonstrate	 that,	had	Pollard	 turned	his	attention	to	 the	Bank,	he	would	have	
discovered	 factory-like	 organisation	 of	 ‘production’	 with	 well-established	 and	 managerial	
systems	in	place	and	strata	of	lower,	middle	and	senior	management.		
Pollard,	along	with	other	commentators	on	the	history	of	management,	acknowledge	
that	 elements	 of	 complex	 organisation	 existed	 long	 before	 industrialisation.2	 Ancient	 and	
classical	 civilisations	 planned,	 organised,	 controlled	 and	 centralised.	 But	 these	managerial	
techniques	were	used	in	support	of	religious,	political	or	military	endeavour	not	industry	or	





and	 oversight	 was	 required	 to	 ensure	 efficiency,	 maximise	 the	 output	 from	 labour	 and	
minimise	losses	such	as	those	from	theft	or	fraud.	All	of	this	required	the	evolution	of	systems	
                                                            
1 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 11.  
2 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 17; John F. Wilson and Andrew Thomson, The Making of Modern 
Management: British Management in Historical Perspective (Oxford, 2006), pp. 6-7.  
3 Wilson and Thomson, Making of Modern Management, p. 6.  










industrialisation:	 first,	 ‘the	 creation	 and	 training	 of	 a	 class	 of	 managers;	 second,	 ‘the	
recruitment,	training,	disciplining	and	acculturation	of	labour’;	third,	the	use	of	accountancy,	
and	 other	 available,	 gathered	 or	 created	 information	 in	 the	 ‘rational	 determination	 of	
…decisions’	 and	 finally	 the	question	of	whether	 entrepreneurs	 operated	by	 a	 ‘theory	 and	
practice	 of	 “management”,	 as	 distinct	 from	merely	making	ad	 hoc	 decisions	 unrelated	 to	
information	about	their	businesses.8	Although	Pollard	warned	against	generalisation	and	did	
indeed	provide	some	examples	of	highly	effective	management	 techniques,	 such	as	 those	
utilised	 by	 Bolton	 and	 Watt,	 he	 concluded	 that	 the	 problems	 of	 management	 during	




industrial	 development,	 remained	 behindhand	 when	 it	 came	 to	 the	 development	 of	
managerial	 techniques.	 Corporate	 structures	 developed	 in	 impressive	 ways	 in	 the	 US,	
                                                            
5 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 14-16.  
6 Wilson and Thomson, Making of Modern Management, p. 3. 
7 Ibid., p. 5.  
8 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 16.  











like	 Pollard,	 Wilson	 and	 Thomson	 but	 it	 will	 establish	 that	 failure	 to	 consider	 the	
financialisation,	as	well	as	the	industrialisation,	of	Britain	restricts	our	understanding	of	the	
development	 of	managerial	 capitalism.	 To	 that	 end	 it	will	 first	 establish	 that	 the	 Bank	 of	
England,	by	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	eighteenth	 century,	 encompassed	 the	 complexities	of	 a	
large-scale	industrial	enterprise	and	thus	warrants	comparison	with	the	types	of	enterprises	
identified	by	Pollard.	It	will	then	explore	the	Bank’s	organisational	and	management	structure	
against	 the	 above-mentioned	 four	 aspects	 of	 management.	 Because	 of	 the	 wealth	 of	
information	available	about	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	longevity	of	the	institution,	the	paper	





Despite	 its	 early	 development,	 longevity	 and	 complexity,	 the	 eighteenth-century	 Bank	 of	
England	has	not	featured	in	histories	of	business	development.	Indeed,	this	period	has	been	
                                                            








featured	 in	 banking	 and	 financial	 histories.	 The	 enforcement	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	
monopoly	and	thus	the	prohibition	of	joint-stock	banking	until	1826	ensured	that,	until	that	
point,	 banking	 operations	 remained	 small	 with	 simple	 organisational	 structures.	 In	
consequence,	 most	 historians	 of	 banking	 do	 not	 spend	 much	 time	 on	 the	 operational	
functions	of	 the	eighteenth-century	 incarnations	of	 their	 subjects.12	 Even	Temin	and	Voth	
who	 were	 more	 concerned	 with	 how	 banking	 operated	 still	 devoted	 little	 space	 to	 the	
question	of	how	the	Hoare	family	ran	its	business	and	they	failed	to	write	of	its	organisation	





century	 has	 been	 largely	 ignored.	 John	 Clapham	 offered	 some	 discussion	 of	 the	 Bank’s	
                                                            
11 John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994 (Manchester, 1995), p. 13 Chandler made the same 
arguments with regard to the US. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: the managerial revolution in 
American business (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1977).  
12 See for example, Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking, 1690-1996 
(Cambridge, 2008); S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: A history, 1695–1973 (London, 1975); W. F. Crick and 
J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint-Stock Banking (London, 1958); L. S. Pressnell, Country banking in 
the industrial revolution (Oxford, 1956); R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the history of English banking (London, 
1957). 
13 Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, Prometheus Shackled: Goldsmith Banks and England’s Financial 
Revolution After 1700 (Oxford, 2013), pp. 136-140.  
14 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783 (London, 1989). For an 
older discussion of public administration see J. E. D. Binney, British finance and public administration, 1774-













American	 Independence	 amidst	 accusations	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	 public	 finances	 and	 an	
attempt	by	Parliament	to	put	its	financial	house	in	order	through	a	Commission	for	Examining	




carried	 on	 in	 [its]	 different	 departments’.18	 The	 Committee	 of	 three	 directors	 were	
empowered	to	investigate	every	aspect	of	business	and	inspect	‘all	such	Books	and	Papers	as	
they	may	think	necessary’.19		
                                                            
15 Notably A. Andreades, A History of the Bank of England (London, 1909); John H. Clapham, The Bank of 
England: A History (2 Volumes. Cambridge, 1966); John Giuseppi, The Bank of England: A History from its 
Foundation in 1694 (London, 1966). 
16 W. Marston Acres, The Bank of England from within (2 vols., London, 1931).  
17 Binney, British Public Finance.  
18 Bank of England Archives [hereafter BEA], M5/212, Minutes of the Committee of Inspection, fo. 1.  













Pollard	was	discussing.	 Indeed,	by	 the	end	of	 the	eighteenth	century	 the	Bank	of	England	
epitomised	managerial	capitalism.	It	was	a	joint-stock	company	with,	what	was	by	that	time,	
a	body	of	several	thousand	shareholders.21	The	Bank’s	dual	role	as	banker	to	the	state	and	
manager	 of	 the	 state’s	 debt	 must	 not	 distract	 us	 from	 its	 status	 as	 a	 private	 business	




the	 numbers	 employed	 by	 the	 large	 insurance	 companies:	 the	 Royal	 Exchange	 and	 Sun	
                                                            
20 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 205.  
21 According to Clapham’s figures there were 2588 shareholders eligible to vote at shareholders’ meetings in 
1771 and 2465 in 1791. To be eligible to vote a shareholder had to have £500 or more in stock and to have held 
that stock for six calendar months. Clapham, Bank of England, p. 285.  
22 H.V. Bowen, ‘The Bank of England during the Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820’ in R. Roberts and D. 
Kynaston (eds.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694-1994 (Oxford, 1995), 1-18. 
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Assurance	 companies.23	 Indeed,	 the	 late	 eighteenth-century	 Bank	 of	 England	 was	
undoubtedly	the	largest	private	employer	of	white-collar	workers	in	Britain,	if	not	the	world.		



















                                                            
23 H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: the East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 (Cambridge, 
2006), p 139; H. M. Boot, Real incomes of the British middle class, 1760-1850: the experience of clerks at the 
East India Company. Economic History Review, 52 (1999), p. 639. The EIC employed a total staff of over 1,700 
if warehouse labourers and dock workers are included in the count. B. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance: 









Handled	at	the	Bank		 77,265,945	 69.85	 2,682,163	 70.72	
Handled	at	South	Sea	House		 27,125,310	 24.52	 829,507	 21.87	
Handled	at	East	India	House		 4,200,000	 3.80	 127,687	 3.37	
Handled	at	the	Exchequer		 2,022,582	 1.83	 153,236	 4.04	
	 	 	 	 	













                                                            
24 Amounts rounded to the nearest £1.  
25 BEA, M5/213, fos. 43-44.  
26 BEA, M5/213, fo. 62.  
27 Ibid., fo. 126.  












of	 Inspection	 reports	 and	 will	 use	 them	 to	 address	 Pollard’s	 four	 aspects	 of	 modern	








affluent	 businessmen,	 often	 bankers	 or	merchants.	 Some	did	 a	 very	 good	 job	 and	 others	
certainly	did	not.	Some	attended	the	Bank’s	meetings	regularly	and	others	did	not.	The	Bank’s	
bye-laws	stipulated	that	not	more	than	sixteen	of	those	who	had	been	directors	in	each	year	
                                                            
29 BEA, M5/213, fos. 8-9.  
30 See for example, BEA, M5/212, fo. 65.  













constituted	 to	 superintend	 the	 day-to-day	 running	 of	 the	 Bank.	 It	 was	 the	 Committee	 of	
Treasury,	 however,	 that	 was	 most	 prominent.	 It	 was	 made	 up	 of	 the	 governor,	 deputy	




presented	 to	 the	 Court	 of	 Directors	 and	 the	Minutes	 of	 Court	 offer	 little	 sense	 of	 active	




                                                            
32 Ibid., p. 90.  
33 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 199.  
34 William Pickett Esq., An apology to the Public for a continued Intrusion on their Notice with an Appeal to the 
free and independent Proprietors of Bank Stock, demonstrating that it is highly proper for them to examine into 
the State of their Affairs (London, 1788), p. 36.  
35 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 202.  
11 
 
a	 period	 in	 which	 very	 few	 participated	 in	 the	 Bank’s	 democratic	 processes.	 Clapham	
estimates	 that,	 during	 the	 early	 1780s,	 only	 around	 100	 to	 130	 of	 the	 more	 than	 2,000	






positions	 above	 their	 colleagues	 is	 absolutely	 clear.	 The	 term	management	 is	 used,	 albeit	
sparingly,	in	the	Committee	of	Inspection’s	reports,	indicating	that	there	was	an	expectation	
that	 business	was	 being	 organised	 and	 ordered.	 Indeed,	 the	 report	 speaks	 of	 the	 overall	
‘management’	of	the	institution	and	refers	several	times	to	the	‘management’	of	government	
debt	undertaken	on	behalf	of	the	state.36	The	term	manager	was	not	used	at	all	but	the	report	
makes	 numerous	mentions	 of	 the	 term	 supervisor	 and	 speaks	 of	 the	 superintendence	 of	
business.	It	also	makes	numerous	mentions	of	the	terms	‘superior’	and	‘chief’,	with	regard	to	
chief	men,	and	as	a	common	description	for	the	head	of	an	office.37		
The	 Bank’s	 chief	 men	 found	 it	 straight-forward	 to	 articulate	 the	 structure	 and	




                                                            
36 BEA, M5/212, fo. 1; fo.123; fo. 136; M5/213, fo. 173; fo. 179.  


























                                                            




















The	men,	 therefore,	 understood	 that	 there	was	 a	 rigid	 reporting	 structure	 outside	 of	 the	
directorship	and	use	of	words	like	‘accountable’	and	‘obliged’	confirm	that	the	senior	men	
were	 responsible	 for	 the	 organisation	 and	 efficiency	 of	 their	 part	 of	 the	 business,	 were	






                                                            
39 A. McKinlay and R. G.Wilson, ‘“Small acts of cunning”: bureaucracy, inspection and the career, c. 1890-
1914’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17 (2006), p. 658.  








clerks	were	 considered	 fully	 competent	 in	 their	work.41	At	 the	East	 India	Company,	 clerks	
were	asked	to	work	for	three	years	before	receiving	a	salary,	which	offers	some	corroboration	








                                                            
41 Calculation based on a sample of 287 out of 321 cases.   












1-3 yrs 4-10 yrs 11-20 yrs 21-30 yrs 31+ yrs 













Salaries	 also	 reflected	 a	 high	 status	 for	 the	 chief	men	 and	managers.	 In	 1783	 the	
highest	paid	men	were	the	chief	accountant,	John	Payne	and	Abraham	Newland,	the	chief	
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44 BEA, M5/213, fo. 78.  
45 Bowen, Business of Empire, p. 141; p. 143.  
46 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 147.  
47 David Mitch, ‘Education and skill of the British labour force’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860 (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 346-47.  



















discipline	 into	 workers.52	 Both	 Thompson	 and	 Pollard	 argued	 that	 factory	 owners	 were	
battling	to	enforce	a	wrench	from	a	past	in	which	labour	in	the	domestic	workshop	allowed	
the	worker	more	 freedom	and	autonomy.	Yet,	 in	 spite	of	 the	 importance	attached	 to	 the	
acculturation	 of	 labour,	 Pollard	 investigations	 suggested	 that	 factory	 owners	 made	 no	
scientific	breakthrough	here.	Problems	were	met	and	resolved	through	improvisation.	Some,	
                                                            
49 BEA, M5/471, Memorandum book of Samuel Bosanquet, 1783-1791.  
50 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 189-90.  
51 Quoted in ibid., p. 190.  
52 E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, Past and Present, 38 (1967), pp. 56-97.  
18 
 
















of	 continuing	 there	 the	 necessary	 time	 for	 doing	 the	 business	 required’.56	 On	 another	
occasion	it	was	noted	that	the	Transfer	Offices	‘not	having	any	chimnies	or	other	apertures	
for	 the	admission	of	 fresh	Air,	are	 so	unwholesome	as	greatly	prejudice	 the	health	of	 the	
                                                            
53 Sidney Pollard, ‘Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution’, Economic History Review, 16 (1963), pp. 
254-271.  
54 Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Time and Work in Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 58 
(1998), p. 33.  
55 Rosenhaft notes the impact on occupational health of clerical work. Eve Rosenhaft, ‘Hands and Minds: 
Clerical work in the first “information society”’, International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 48 (2003), p. 
39. 









procedures	 for	 recruitment.	 Its	 policies	 ensured	 that	 all	 new	 employees	 had	 been	
recommended	by	one	of	the	directors	of	the	Bank.	While	this	personal	introduction	did	not	












                                                            
57 Ibid., fo. 22.  
58 For a full account of the recruitment process see Anne L. Murphy, ‘Writes a fair hand and appears to be well 
qualified’: recruiting Bank of England clerks at the start of the nineteenth century’, Financial History Review, 
22 (2015), pp. 19-44.  
















through	 negligence,	 clerks	 could	 find	 their	 wages	 stopped	 in	 order	 to	 compensate	 the	
institution.		
With	 regard	 to	 day-to-day	 work	 discipline,	 a	 particular	 problem	 in	 the	 factory	 was	





                                                            
60 Mitch, ‘Education and skill’, p. 347. 
61 Acres, Bank from Within, p. 132.  
62 Ibid., p. 133.  
63 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 213.  
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which	 was	 very	 necessary,	 for	 matters	 of	 immense	 consequence	 passed	 through	 their	
hands’.65	 Indeed,	all	heads	except	for	Mr	Vickery	praised	the	men	under	their	supervision.	













work,	 more	 recently	 scholars	 have	 focused	 on	 communication	 and	 negotiation	 between	
                                                            
64 BEA, M5/213, fo. 165.  
65 BEA, M5/212, fo. 85.  
66 BEA, M5/213, fo. 64.  
67 Acres, Bank from Within, pp. 356-57.  
68 BEA, E41, passim.  
22 
 





‘recommended	 to	 the	 Governor	 &	 Committee	 of	 Treasury	 to	 take	 their	 case	 into	
consideration’.70	 The	 acculturation	 of	 labour,	 therefore,	 was	 a	 complex	 process	 in	 which	












                                                            
69 Kate Smith, Material Goods, Moving Hands: perceiving production in England, 1700-1830 (Manchester, 
2014), pp. 86-87.  
70 BEA, M5/213, fo. 48.  
71 Alice Dolan, ‘The Fabric of Life: Time and Textiles in an Eighteenth-Century Plebeian Home’, Home 
Cultures: The Journal of Architecture, Design and Domestic Space, 11 (2014), pp. 353-374.  
72 For a discussion of bookkeeping as a key technology, especially in European state-formation, see Pepijn 
Brandon, ‘Accounting for Power: Bookkeeping and the Rationalization of Dutch Naval Administration’ in Jeff 




ledgers	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 registers	 covering	 all	 aspects	 of	 its	 business.73	 There	 is	












The	 very	 existence	 of	 these	 systems	 say	 something	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 precocity	 as	 an	
eighteenth-century	 business.	 The	 level	 and	 complexity	 of	 its	work	 could	 not	 be	managed	
without	robust	accounting	systems.	This	is	especially	clear	in	the	management	of	the	national	
debt	and	 it	sets	the	Bank	apart	certainly	 from	some	departments	of	 the	state	which	were	
sometimes	chaotic.76	Yet,	Pollard’s	underlying	question	was	whether	information	gathering	
and	 analysis	 was	 used	 in	 the	 control	 and	 development	 of	 the	 business.	 Arguably	 the	
establishment	of	a	system	of	Inspection	at	the	Bank	provides	insight	into	this	issue	that	moves	
                                                            
73 For a short digest of the surviving ledgers see Clapham, Bank of England, I, p. 303.  
74 BEA M5/212, fo. 53.  
75 BEA, M5/213, fo. 115.  
76 Brandon, ‘Accounting for Power’, p. 152.  
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exposed	 through	 the	whole	 course	 of	 the	 day,	 not	 only	 to	 every	 Clerk	 in	 that	
Office…but	also	to	many	others	who	transact	business	near	the	place;	&	even	to	







In	 addition	 to	 their	 attempts	 to	 improve	 security,	 the	 Inspectors	 committed	 time	 to	
exploring	 the	most	 efficient	 means	 of	 doing	 the	 work.	 In	 this	 they	 worked	 on	 the	 same	




                                                            
77 BEA. M5/213, fo. 72.  
78 BEA, M5/212, fos. 70-71.  





















The	 flows	 of	 information	 and	 expertise	 between	 sites	 and	 individuals	 is	 being	
emphasised	in	more	recent	scholarship.84	In	this	respect,	perhaps	the	Bank’s	directors	were	
doing	 little	 different	 to	 other	 employers	 in	 listening	 to	 their	 workers	 and	 acting	 on	 their	
analyses	 of	 problems.	 Nonetheless,	 Pollard’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 use	 of	 accountancy	 and	
gathered	information	in	business	was	‘largely	negative’.	His	view	was	that	business	owners	
                                                            
80 Ibid., fo. 111. 
81 Ibid., fo. 112.  
82 BEA, M5/213, fo. 68.  
83 BEA, M5/212, fo. 55.  
84 See for example Margaret C. Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West (Oxford, 1997), 
Smith, Material Goods, Moving Hands.   
26 
 
encountered	 technical	 difficulties	 in	 compiling	data	 and	 the	monopolistic	 advantages	 that	
many	entrepreneurs	enjoyed	during	the	late	eighteenth	century	meant	that	few	had	to	take	
precise	 account	 of	 their	 costs	 or	 to	 consider	 ways	 of	 cutting	 those	 costs	 or	 improving	
efficiency.85	 The	 Bank,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 and	 although	 also	 enjoying	 a	 significant	















solutions	 in	 the	 ‘experience	 and	 thinking	 of	 others’	 and	 in	 encouraging	 an	 exchange	 of	
information.87		
                                                            
85 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 245.  
86 Wilson and Thomson, Modern Management, p. 31.  



























among	 the	 clerks	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 creating	 ‘a	 chain	 of	 obedience,	 from	 the	 Juniors	
                                                            
88 BEA, M5/213, fo. 179.  







around	 3.00pm	 and	 thus	 leaving	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 aspects	 of	 the	 business,	
including	securing	the	records	and	the	buildings	overnight,	in	the	hands	of	the	more	junior	
men.	 The	 Inspectors	 defined	 this	 as	 ‘extraordinary’.91	 And	 they	 asserted,	 ‘Time	may	 have	
sanctified	 the	 custom,	 [but]	 the	 reverse	 of	 it	would	 have	 appeared	 a	much	more	 natural	
regulation:	for	surely	if	in	any	situation	of	Trust	a	compleat	superintendence	is	desireable,	it	
must	be	more	immediately	necessary	where	the	Trust	is	of	such	infinite	importance’.92		
	 In	 addition	 to	 requiring	 greater	 managerial	 diligence	 from	 the	 senior	 men,	 the	









                                                            
90 Ibid., fo. 173.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid., fo. 174.  
93 Ibid., fos. 174-75.  











The	 system	 of	 inspection	 at	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 once	 implemented	 was	 not	 halted.	
Permanent	committees	were	established	for	monitoring	the	most	important	of	its	functions.	
From	 the	 start	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 a	 closer	 eye	was	 kept	 on	 the	 recruitment	 and	
management	 of	 staff	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 what	 was	 by	 this	 time	 a	 set	 of	 written	
regulations	 governing	 each	 office.	 The	 result	 of	 this	was	 tighter	 internal	 controls	 and	 the	
maintenance	of	 the	efficiency	 for	which	 the	Bank	was	already	 justly	 feted.	 If	we	 seek	 the	
genesis	of	modern	management,	therefore,	the	Bank	surely	offers	a	place	to	start.		
Yet,	 one	 issue	 does	 remain	 and	 that	 is	 the	 question	 of	 broader	 impact.	 Good	
managerial	practice	may	have	begun	to	develop	at	the	Bank	but	there	is	no	evidence	at	all	







the	workings	 of	 the	 national	 debt.95	 It	 is	 time	 that	 scholars	 turned	 their	 attention	 in	 this	



































                                                            
95 Brewer, Sinews of Power; M. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 
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